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The Supreme Court, Civil Rights
and Civil Dissonance*
Jack Greenbergt
Because it has the power to affect broad currents of American
thought and behavior, the Supreme Court must of necessity operate
with some consciousness of the social effects of its determinations, The
synthesizing of precedent and the interpretation of statutes and of the
Constitution are of course the stuff of day-to-day decision-making. But
such considerations as the capacity of legal pronouncements to teach
certain principles, the power of the courts to compel desirable conduct,
and the possibility that particular rulings will reinforce or weaken
obedience to the law can, in appropriate cases, exercise considerable
influence upon Court determinations.
Such considerations, to be sure, seldom manifest themselves on the
surface of decisions in which they play a role. The Justices themselves
-or some of them-may not be aware of certain unarticulated prem-
ises underlying their decisions in a given case or line of cases. In addi-
tion, the popular belief that social policy should not be weighed in
deciding particular cases contributes to judicial reticence to acknowl-
edge such considerations. More important, perhaps, there is frequently
no need to articulate important policies behind a decision if the
Justices choose not to do so. Much of the Court's policy-making is
accomplished by simple grant and denial of certiorari, grounds for
which are rarely set forth no matter how conventional they may be.
Furthermore, what is not said is sometimes fully as important to the
effect of a decision as what is explicitly stated. Since these policy con-
siderations either operate sub rosa or influence only what is left out of
an opinion, they normally cannot be perceived by studying a single
Court decision. Their existence must be inferred from patterns of
decision over a period of years, by comparison and contrast of the
Court's varying treatments of related lines of cases.
The civil rights movement has given rise to a number of important
* This article is based on the 1966 Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown University. The
reader should note that I have been counsel in many of the cases cited herein, which has
perhaps given some insight at the risk of impairing vision in other respects.
t Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. A.B. 1945,
LL.B. 1948, Columbia University.
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lines of Supreme Court decisions which illustrate the influence of such
unarticulated policy considerations. Two of these-the school desegre-
gation and protest demonstration cases-have recently completed
phases of development. The school cases have passed from a period in
which the Court limited itself to the enunciation of general principles
of educational equality, to one in which the Court has shown an
increasing willingness to involve itself in details of desegregation plans.
The pattern followed by the protest cases has been nearly the opposite.
From a period of detailed review of sit-in convictions, accompanied
almost invariably by reversal on narrow grounds, the Court has pro-
gressed to a point where it frequently leaves the last word to the states
in protest demonstration cases, sometimes affirming with broad pro-
nouncements on public order and property rights.
These changing patterns of Court decision have paralleled other
legal and social developments. In the school desegregation area passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 made possible in significant degree
by the demonstrations which were part of the heritage of Brown v.
Board of Education,2 has resulted in the supplementing of private-suit
enforcement of desegregation by federal enforcement under Title VI
of the Act. In the protest demonstration area the last eight years have
seen a progression from the nonviolent 1960 Greensboro sit-ins through
the Selma march of 1965 to a period of widespread social protest. In
recent years civil rights protests have been joined in national promi-
nence by other demonstrations such as those against the war in Viet
Nam, or the student uprisings at Berkeley and Columbia. During the
same period the country has been shocked by the summer riots which
have wracked our cities. And although the early civil rights demonstra-
tions and much of the protest which has succeeded them have differed
in participants, purposes, methods and legality, there has been an easy
tendency to lump together the growing civil dissonances as a single
phenomenon.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1964); see 45 C.F.R. 80 et seq. (1967).
2. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. My meaning is more dearly expressed by the term "civil dissonance" than by the
more common "civil disobedience." Civil disobedience connotes illegal conduct pursued
out of political motives, but much protest that has been called "civilly disobedient," even
by the actors themselves, has in fact been legal. Violation of a local law which is in
conflict -with the Constitution or federal law (e.g., freedom rides) is not civilly disobedient,
because the Constitution validates the conduct in question: the local law is invalid. More.
over, action giving rise to test case litigation ought not to be viewred as civil disobedience.
Those engaged in lunch counter sit-ins, for example, even if they had not been ultimately
upheld by the courts and Congress, arguably believed that they had a Fourteenth
Amendment right to sit-in. At least three Justices of the Supreme Court agreed with
them. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964). On the other hand, I .vould define
blocking the Triboro Bridge as "civil disobedience." I would also so define some of the
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It is not fortuitous that the school desegregation and sit-in lines of
decision have developed as they have. I suggest that the patterns of
social development outlined above are interrelated with one another;
that there are connections between the early school decision rhetoric,
the sit-in demonstrations, the early reversals of sit-in convictions, the
Civil Rights Act, the spreading civil dissonance and the Court's recent
tendency to let protest convictions stand. I suggest, furthermore, that
those connections can perhaps best be understood in terms of the
Court's-and the law's-role as a teacher.
On the one hand the Court can teach by the direct advocacy of
ideas, by the eloquent and forceful declaration of principles it holds
dear. On the other it can "teach" by approving or condemning certain
conduct. In either case the ultimate goal is the encouragement of
desired forms of thought and behavior. The school desegregation cases
were in this sense far more than enforceable judgments. Indeed for
almost ten years enforcement was perhaps their least important aspect.
The opinions proclaimed for the first time from the summit of one
of the three branches of the federal government the immorality as
well as the illegality of segregation. The early protest decisions were
also more than simply enforceable judgments. In ultimate effect they
were intimately related to the school decisions, protecting a movement
that was forcefully teaching the American people the same lessons that
the school decisions had abstractly taught.
I. The Teaching of the School Desegregation Cases
Brown v. Board of Education4 proved to be the Declaration of
Independence of its day. Together with the other school desegregation
cases5 it profoundly affected national thinking and has served as the
principal ideological engine of today's civil rights movement.0 With-
recent rioting, although the political motivation has usually been unarticulated. In sonic
cases there may be disagreement over whether motivation is political and whether conduct
is legal, illegal, or reasonably viewed as test case material. But that is inevitable in making
legal and moral judgments. To complicate matters further, clearly Illegal conduct may be
condoned by a jury which has the last word on whether to convict or not. E.g., although
clearly guilty, Peter Zenger was acquitted. It is fruitless to debate whether the actor il
such a case has been civilly disobedient or not.
4. 374 U.S 483 (1954.)
5. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11), 849
U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Although this result was one of the Supreme Court's great achlievements, tile
charge is still sometimes made that the Court transgressed its proper function by making
a "political" decision, one which did more than adjudicate rights of particular litigants,
The extrajudicial consequences, it has been suggested, demonstrate that the decision
rested on forbidden considerations. But other decisions also have had immense public
1522
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out announcing any radically new ideas, it nevertheless helped to
crystallize a national commitment to eradicate racial inequality. To a
nation which had recently fought a war against Nazism and its doc-
trines of racial inferiority, to a nation whose regional, educational and
social barriers were being threatened and in some cases breached and
overthrown by advances in communication and transportation, to a
nation whose Negroes, together with its other citizens, had begun to
enjoy the benefits of a higher level of prosperity and to hunger for
more, the Court said that this is not a nation which may sort out
people on the basis of race.
Thus Brown forcefully and authoritatively proclaimed an ideal. But
the decision, because it was a decision of the Court, had a force that
ordinary speech cannot have. While ordinary speech cannot require a
response, a lawyer could put the Brown holding into the machinery
of the legal process and bring about confrontations demanding some
sort of answers. In Atlanta, Birmingham, Nashville, Little Rock, New
Orleans--indeed in every large and medium-size city in the South as
well as in more than a hundred rural counties, lawyers filed suits
requesting the enforcement of rights assured or suggested by tie
Brown decision. The resulting discussion among lawyers, judges, aca-
demics and leading private citizens-through press, radio, television
consequences. Anthony Leivis's GwaoN's TRUAtMpr (1964) tells how Gideon v. Wain wight,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel in state criminal cases, spurred
an entire national legal aid movement. It is too early to know all the political ramifica.
tions, but the reapportionment cases probably will have comparable effect. So will the
line of cases following Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). That a Supreme Court
decision pervasively affects society is hardly unusual or discrediting.
It should be noted that the school cases from Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
US. 477 (1938), through Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), and then
on to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), were a carefully considered and
cautiously developed line of precedents. A lawyer from another planet reading the 1950
McLaurin decision, holding that a Negro teacher attending graduate school was treated
unequally by being separated because of his race in a classroom, library and cafeteria
attended by white classmates, would have readily anticipated Brown, which held that
segregating his students was just as unequal. The only inequality McLaurin suffered,
after all, was segregation: segregation was thus held unequal per se in 1950. Moreover,
the opinion decried the consequences of segregated education of teachers because of the
effect it would have on pupils. This was only a hint of what was to come, but a broad
one.
7. In retrospect, some hint that the country was getting ready to adopt higher
standards of equality appeared in the 1947 Report of President Truman's Committee on
Civil Rights. Pansmarr's Comrxrrr.m ON Cxvn. Rios, RE'oRr: To SEcuan TiMsE RIcIrrs
(1947). Though it had no force of law, and although Congress and the President did not
significantly embrace its suggestions until 1964, this report called for integrating all aspects
of public life, extending the franchise on a full and equal basis, abolishing the poll tax,
withholding federal funds from institutions that segregate, ending segregation in the
District of Columbia (which was as segregated in 1948 as Jackson, Mississippi. in 1964),
enacting a national Fair Employment Practices Act, abolishing segregation in the armed
forces, and so forth. For the Committee's recommendations, see id. 151-78.
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and direct confrontation-made important breaches in the class, ethnic
and other barriers which belie the popular image of America as one
great "melting pot." Lawsuits created a dialogue between leaders of
the Negro and white communities. The legal process drew both sides
into a single arena and made them deal with well-defined issues. In
addition, suits stimulated informal discussions between the parties that
until then had been taboo. Desegregation, though often limited and
sometimes of token nature, introduced new living experiences to
private citizens and public officials as well.
The stimulation of this great national dialogue was for many years,
however, the extent of the Supreme Court's involvement in the school
desegregation struggle. While repeatedly and unequivocally asserting
as a general proposition that school boards must desegregate and must
do so promptly, the Court refrained from involving itself in the details
of the implementation process and until recently has assumed jurisdic-
tion only on occasions when a large issue of principle was at stake.
The second Brown opinion" was the first opportunity for the Court
to discuss implementation. As in the earlier decision, the Court con-
fined itself to laying down general principles. Despite the abuse that
has been heaped on the opinion's "deliberate speed" formula, however,
the Court did state the basic requirements of school desegregation in
unequivocal terms. Hostility was ruled out as a ground for delay; the
entire system had to be desegregated; only practical administrative
considerations could justify anything less. If school boards had followed
the lead of Brown 11, the nation's schools would have been desegre-
gated in a few years. Whatever blame is assignable to the 1955 opinion
for the slow pace that actually followed must be charged to its tone,
which in the context of the widespread assumption that desegregation
would have to be accomplished instantaneously was taken by many
school boards to indicate judicial reluctance to upset the status quo.
Between 1955 and 1958, the year of the Little Rock case," the Court
did not discuss school segregation at all. It merely declined to review
cases.' 0 The Little Rock case was an occasion for reaffirmation of prin-
8. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Cases in which plaintiffs petitioned: Hood v. Board of Trustees, 352 U.S. 870 (1956),
denying cert. to 232 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1956) (holding that exhaustion of state remedies
was required prior to consideration of a school desegregation suit by the federal courts),
Carson v. Warlick, 353 U.S. 910 (1957), denying cert. to 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (hold.
ing that exhaustion of remedies under the North Carolina pupil placement act wag
required); De Febio v. County School Bd., 357 U.S. 218 (1958), denying cert. to and
dismissing appeal from 199 Va. 511, 100 S.E.2d 760 (1957) (upholding the validity of the
Virginia pupil placement act) (appeal treated as petition for writ of certiorari); S1ada v.
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ciple. The Court not only endorsed the substantive portions of Brown,
but took the unique step of asserting that each and every member of
the Court, including those Justices who had ascended to the bench
following Brown, agreed in "unanimously reaffirm[ing]"-u the earlier
opinion. Nothing less was required to demonstrate that the political
opposition to Brown would not move the Court to retract or modify it.
Again the opinion was notable chiefly for its broad-brushed enuncia-
tion of principle. It began with the stern warning that "[a]s this case
reaches us it raises questions of the highest importance to the mainte-
nance of our federal system of government."'2 The Court reviewed at
some length and in somewhat more specific terms the standards estab-
lished by Brown II, reasserting the need for expedition in desegregat-
ing. Almost nothing, however, was said about the details or method of
desegregation in Little Rock, nor about its pace. The case is still in
the courts.' 3
From 1958 to 1963, with few exceptions, the Court continued to
refuse to review school cases, whether brought up by plaintiffs or by
defendant school boards. The exceptional cases it did review followed
the established pattern of emphasizing principle and avoiding the
specifics of implementation.' 4 One of those exceptions, Goss v. Board of
Education,'5 struck down a transfer plan which allowed children in a
Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 906 (1958), denying cert. to 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1938) (uphold-
ing plan which provided for gradual admission to grades which were not then over-
crowded and complete integration by 1963).
Cases in which the School Board petitioned: Rippy v. Brom, 352 US. 878 (196),
denying cert. to 283 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1956); Rawdon v. Ja clon, 352 US. 9Z (1936),
denying cert. to 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1956); School Bd. of Charlottesville v. Allen, 353
U.S. 910 (1957), denying cert. to 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956); County School Bd. v. Thomp-
son, 353 U.S. 911 (1957), denying cert. to 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956); Orleans Parish
School Bd. v. Bush, 854 U.S. 921 (1957), denying cert. to 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957);
School Bd. v. Atkins, 355 U.S. 855 (1957), denying cert. to 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 197);
County School Bd. of Prince Edward County v. Allen, 355 U.S. 953 (1958), denying cert. to
249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957); County School Bd. v. Thompson, 356 U.S. 958 (1958), denying
cert to 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1957).
11. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967).
14. A minor exception to this rule was the per curiam opinion in Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101, aff'g with reservations 162 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D.
Ala. 1958), which came to the Court on appeal from a judgment refusing to hold Alabama's
pupil assignment law unconstitutional on its face. The judgment below was afirmed, but
with qualifications reserving the right to review the law in operation that would permit
the issues to be relitigated another day.
It should be noted that if the case had come up on certiorari, the same attitude would
have been expressed by denial of certiorari. No one doubted that pupil assignment was de-
signed to maintain segregation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to deny
certiorari in cases which required exhaustion of the remedies provided by state pupil
placement acts. Covington v. Edwards, 361 U.S. 840 (1959), denying cert. to 264 F.2d 780
(4th Cir. 1959); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 361 U.S. 818 (1959), denying cert. to
265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959).
15. 373 U.S. 683 (1963), reversing in part and remanding 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
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racial minority in a school to transfer out. The decision reflected not
so much a concern with the details of implementation as a desire to
invalidate a blatantly racial scheme, one that openly employed race
as a standard for school assignment."0
Goss also spoke powerfully about the long delay in effective desegre-
gation following Brown. "[N]ine years after the first Brown decision,"
it declared, "the context in which we must interpret and apply this
language [of Brown II] to plans for desegregation has been significantly
altered. Compare Watson v. Memphis ... .,x7 Watson, it is interesting
to note, was not a school case at all, but dealt with parks. That the
Court should have chosen such a setting for a pronouncement on
changing school desegregation standards' s was, however, quite in keep-
ing with its emphasis on principles rather than specifics of school
integration."0
Previously, however, the Court had refused to decide whether a twelve year grade.at-a.
time plan was too slow in Kelley v. Board of Educ., -61 U.S. 924 (1959), denying cert. to
270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), and denied certiorari in that case to review whether those
parts of the plan which "explicitly recognized race as an absolute ground for the transfer
of students between schools, thereby perpetuating rather than limiting racial discrhnlna.
tion," were valid. The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented, On the
other hand, the Court refused to hear cases in which school boards tried to overturn
integration orders. E.g., Buchanan v. Evans, 358 U.S. 836 (1958), denying cert. to 256
F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958); County School Bd. of Prince Edward County v. Allen, 360 U.S.
923 (1959), refusing to stay application of Duckworth v. James, 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959),
Ennis v. Evans, 364 U.S. 933 (1961), denying cert. to 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960); Board of
Educ. v. Taylor, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), denying cert. to 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961); Board of
School Comm'rs v. Davis, 375 U.S. 894 (1963), denying cert. to 322 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1963).
The New Orleans litigation was vast and in its early phases also involved the funda.
mental issue of resistance or obedience. See Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S.
569 (1961), 364 U.S. 500 (1960).
16. It is significant that in a companion case, Maxwell v. County Bd. of Educ., the
Court limited its grant of certiorari to the same racial transfer question, ignoring the
issue of whether the named plaintiffs in Maxwell should have been admitted to formerly
all-white schools even though the plan had not yet reached their grade and never would
include them. 371 U.S. 811 (1962).
17. 873 U.S. 683, 689, citing Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
18. "[(W]e cannot ignore the passage of a substantial period of tume since the original
declaration of the manifest unconstitutionality of racial practices such as are here
challenged, the repeated and numerous decisions giving notice of such illegality, and the
many intervening opportunities heretofore available to attain the equality of treatment
which the Fourteenth Amendment commands the States to achieve . . . . Given the
extended time which has elapsed, it is far from clear that the mandate of the second
Brown decision requiring that desegregation proceed with 'all deliberate speed' would
today be fully satisfied by types of plans or programs for desegregation of public educa-
tional facilities which eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient.' 373 U.S. at
529-30.
19. The Watson language was requoted in Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263, 264-65
(1965), the Atlanta school case of the 1964 term. Calhoun epitomizes the approach the
Court had been taking towards the school desegregation problem. The record in the case
presented detailed evidence supporting the appellant's contention that the Atlanta school
board was not desegregating as required by law. The Board alleged in the Supreme
Court that certain events had occurred following disposition of the case below. Instead
of deciding on the original record or considering supervening allegations of fact (on
1526
The Supreme Court
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked a watershed in the Court's
treatment of school desegregation cases. In the 1965 term three school
cases were decided. Two of them, Bradley v. School Board and Gilliam
v. School Board,20 marked a limited departure from the earlier pattern
of decisions. They held that plaintiffs were entitled to hearings on the
impact of teacher segregation on the desegregation process, adding, in
the style of Goss, Calhoun and Watson, that "[d]elays in desegregation
of school systems are no longer tolerable."2' Gilliam also refused to
discuss a gerrymandering question raised in the petition for certiorari.
The third decision, however, manifested a distinct change in the
Court's willingness to grapple with details of enforcement in school
cases. Rogers v. Paul,22 after quoting the Bradley principle that
"[d]elays in desegregating public school systems are no longer toler-
able," ordered prompt admission of Negro children to a high school
from which they had been excluded because the district's gradual
desegregation plan had not reached their grades:
Pending the desegregation of the public high schools of Fort
Smith according to a general plan consistent with this principle,
petitioner and those similarly situated shall be allowed immediate
transfer to the high school that has the more extensive curriculum
and from which they are excluded because of their race.2
The extent of the Court's willingness to involve itself in the details
of enforcement is still unclear. Until very recently Rogers was as far
as the Court had gone. In May of this year, however, three further
decisions24 examined whether certain "freedom-of-choice" plans ful-
filled the Boards "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert [the state-imposed dual school system] to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch."' 25 Green, Monroe and Raney all emphasized that they were
striking down the challenged plans as applied, not in the abstract, and
Green and Raney took the further step of suggesting specifically that
which there had been no trial), the Court sent the case back for appraisal of the Board
of Education's new resolution on pupil transfer in the light of Watson and the nerly
announced attitude of urgency.
20. 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (companion cases).
21. Id. at 105.
22. 382 US. 198 (1965).
23. Id. at 199-200.
24. Green v. County School Bd., 36 U.S.L.W. 4476 (US. May 27, 1968); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs., 36 U.S.L.W. 4480 (U.S. May 27, 1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 36
U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. May 27, 1968).
25. Green v. County School Bd. 26 U.S.L.W. at 4478.
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geographical zoning might serve as the basis for acceptable plans. The
Court has clearly moved away from its pre-Civil Rights Act role as an
exponent of guiding principles alone to a more active involvement in
the particulars of school desegregation.
II. Protecting the Protester
The role played by the Supreme Court in the sit-in cases produced
by the civil rights demonstrations of the early 1960's was precisely the
reverse of its approach in the school cases. Between 1961 and 1965 the
Court passed on the merits of more that 30 sit-in prosecutions for
entering upon or refusing to leave privately owned public accommoda.
tions--usually restaurants-which excluded or segregated Negroes.
Demonstrators were typically prosecuted for trespass, breach of the
peace and similar crimes, and were defended on the grounds that the
state was suppressing free speech and enforcing racial discrimination
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The protestors
won virtually all of their cases in the Supreme Court. Almost invari-
ably, however, the Court's decisions rested on the narrowest possible
grounds, without reaching the basic constitutional issues involved.-0
The pattern of decision is highly unusual if the cases are viewed in
isolation as so many trespass, breach of the peace, disorderly conduct
and weight of evidence cases. It is unheard of for the Supreme Court,
which can decide only a relatively small number of cases each term, to
repeatedly take up such apparently minor matters. Viewed in the
context of race relations in the United States, however, the Court's
constant involvement can be understood as reflecting concern that a
nonviolent movement, struggling toward the same goals that the Court
itself had urged more abstractly on the nation in the early school
desegregation decisions, should not be worn down by petty prosecu-
tions.
What might be called the first sit-in case, Boynton v. Yirginia,1
26. The civil rights movement has, of course, made a great deal of basic free speech
law. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), went a long way toward recognlzlnp
the absolute right of freedom of the press against libel claims, NAACP v. Button, 
571
U.S. 415 (1963), asserted the principle that a civil rights association has the right te
induce members of the public to participate in litigation asserting their civil rightg
notwithstanding local rules forbidding lawyers to solicit clients. And in NAACP v. Ala.
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court, announcing important principles of the right of
free association, upheld the NAACP when it refused to reveal its membership lists to
the State of Alabama, asserting that to do so would expose its members to reprisal, But
there have been few such dear-cut doctrinal declarations in cases passing on the activist
aspect of the protest movement.
27. 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
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actually stemmed from a 1959 incident. Certiorari was granted in
February 1960 about a month after the sit-ins burst upon the nation.
Boynton was not a demonstrator. In the course of a trip home to Ala-
bama, he requested service at the white lunch counter of a Richmond
bus terminal after finding that the colored one was fully occupied, and
was convicted of trespass for refusing to leave when ordered to do so by
the manager. Important constitutional questions were involved. Did
the Fourteenth Amendment permit the state to enforce by trespass
prosecution a segregation rule of a private restaurant manager? Had
the manager's interference with Boynton's journey burdened interstate
commerce in violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
Constitution?
The Court avoided both questions. Instead, Justice Black's opinion
held-although the parties had not argued the issue-that the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which prohibits discrimination by motor carriers,
covers restaurant service offered as an integral part of a carrier's service
during a bus trip. This search for the narrow ground and avoidance of
general pronouncement, so unlike the school case implementation
decisions, typified the jurisprudence of protest decisions in years to
come.
In 1961 the Court decided the first three sit-in cases to arise out of
actual demonstrations, Garner v. Louisiana, Briscoe v. Louisiana and
Hoston v. Louisiana.28 Plaintiffs argued that there was no evidence to
sustain their convictions, that they were engaged in constitutionally
protected free speech, and that they enjoyed Fourteenth Amendment
immunity from prosecution for violating segregation rules of private
managers of public accommodations. The Court reversed on the ground
that the record contained no evidence that defendants had disturbed
the peace, a decision of little or no meaning in doctrinal terms. But to
the young people in the movement it suggested that courts would
protect them. The movement was encouraged.
In 1963 the Court decided another series of sit-in cases. These arose
in Greenville,2 9 Birmingham,30 Durham3' and New Orleans.32 Green-
ville, Birmingham and Durham had city ordinances requiring racial
segregation in public accommodations. The Court again declined to
pass upon broad First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, but held
28. 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (companion cases).
29. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963 .
30. Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
31. Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
32. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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that the segregation complained of was not private discrimination,
because segregation at lunch counters was required by ordinance in
those cities. The convictions were therefore invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause as enforcement of governmentally required dis-
crimination.33 New Orleans had no city ordinance requiring segrega-
tion, but the mayor and police chief had publicly declared that sit-in
demonstrations would not be tolerated. The Court treated this as equiv-
alent to an ordinance requiring segregation and reversed. Once more,
a series of decisions on limited grounds made no great new constitu-
tional doctrine but nevertheless protected the demonstrators.84
The following June the Supreme Court reversed eleven sit-in
convictions on a wide variety of grounds. In Griffin v. Maryland35 an
amusement park employee who also was a deputy sheriff had ordered
Negroes to leave the premises; after they refused they were arrested
and convicted. The Court held that although the park was private
property, an individual vested with state authority had participated in
delivering the order to stay off the premises, which constituted sufficient
state action to invalidate the convictions. In Barr v. City of Cotrm-
bia36 the Court found no evidence to sustain convictions for breach of
the peace. Since the record showed that the demonstrators had been
peaceful, conviction denied them due process of law. Boule v. City of
Columbia&T held that a South Carolina trespass statute had been
applied to demonstrators in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because under prior South Carolina decisions the law covered only
initial entry on premises after notice to stay off, and not a refusal to
leave after having come on with permission. The convictions were
thus unconstitutional because they were based on a retroactive inter-
pretation of the law which did not give fair warning of what conduct
was prohibited. Robinson v. Florida,3 decided the same day, held that
Florida Board of Health regulations requiring segregated toilets in
33. In the Durham case the segregation ordinance was not in the record of the case
and the state argued that it could not be considered as a ground for invalidating the
conviction. The Court nevertheless vacated that judgment as well and sent it back to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina for reconsideration in light of the Greenville and
Birmingham decisions.
34. Shortly thereafter the Court, without oral argument, vacated judgments of con.
viction in five demonstration cases and asked Virginia to consider whether the Greenville
case affected them. Randolph v. Virginia, 374 U.S. 97 (1963); Henry v. Virginia, 374 U.S.
98 (1963); Thompson v. Virginia, 374 U.S. 99 (1963); Wood v. Virginia, 37, V,S, 100
(1963); Daniels v. Virginia, 374 U.S. 500 (1963). No important legal principle% were
articulated. Indeed, the cases were disposed of by asking questions, not by giving answers.
35. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
36. 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
37. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
38. 378 US. 153 (1964).
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restaurants were like the segregation ordinances in Greenville, Durham
and Birmingham. Indirectly, they compelled segregation because they
required integrated restaurants to have two sets of rest rooms. Appel-
lants' trespass convictions were therefore held to reflect a state policy
of encouraging segregated restaurants, and to be a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Other cases from Virginia a9 North Carolina,40
South Carolinae1 and Maryland4- were vacated for reconsideration
in the light of the preceding decisions.
Throughout this period the vagueness doctrine, which weaves per-
vasively through free speech law, was employed by the Court as an-
other limited ground of disposition in demonstration cases. The re-
quirement that laws be precise enough so that local officials cannot
distort them to suppress unpopular views found frequent application
in cases involving common law breach of the peace and similar amor-
phous offenses. In Edwards v. South Carolina4a the Court reversed a
series of convictions for peaceful assembly and parading on the state-
house grounds; it held that the common law breach of the peace
doctrine under which defendants had been convicted was so general
and vague that it allowed unconstitutional infringement of their First
Amendments rights.
44
Bell v. Maryland,45 decided on June 22, 1964, marked the beginning
of the end for prosecutions of sit-in demonstrators. After the Maryland
Court of Appeals had affirmed the conviction, but while the case was
still pending on writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court, Maryland
passed its own state civil rights, law, making it unlawful for restaurants
to deny service to any person because of his race. Noting the new state
39. Green v. Virginia, 378 U.S. 550 (1964); Harris v. Virginia. 378 US. 552 (1961).
40. Williams v. North Carolina, 378 U.S. 548 (1964); Fox v. North Carolina, 378 US.
587 (1964).
41. Mitchell v. City of Charleston, 378 U.S. 551 (1964).
42. Drews v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 547 (1964).
43. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
44. In October 1963 the Court reversed another South Carolina judgment, Fields v.
South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963), involving a similar demonstration and macated another
involving like facts, Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 375 US. 6 (1963), for reconsideration.
Both rulings were summary, based upon the briefs without argument, and both cited
Edwards. When the Supreme Court of South Carolina reaffinned Henry, the Court,
again upon briefs and without argument, reversed and finally disposed of the case,
holding that the law petitioners had violated was vague and that the state inay not make
criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. 376 U.S. 776 (1964). A conviction of
Negroes for disturbing the peace by playing basketball in a white park-the game also
could be regarded as a protest against segregation in the park-was reversed in Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963). The breach of the peace statute, it was held, did not givc
adequate notice that playing in the park was a crime. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US.
536, 552, 558 (convictions for breach of the peace and obstructing public passages
reversed).
45. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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law, the Court pointed to the ancient common law doctrine of "abate-
ment," which states that if the reason for punishment ceases while a
case is still in the courts, punishment ought not to be inflicted. Since it
thought that the Maryland courts might apply such a rule to the Bell
case, the Court sent the case back for reconsideration. The Court was
also aware that Congress was less than two weeks from passing a
national public accommodations act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. It did not take much imagination to predict that the federal
law might similarly affect convictions all over the country.
Indeed the principal argument of defendants in Hamm v. City of
Rock Hill and Lupper v. Arkansas,40 cases decided in December of the
same year, was that the 1964 Civil Rights Act abated sit-in convictions
based on acts which could not have been prosecuted if performed
after the passage of the statute. The Supreme Court agreed and held
the convictions abated. The law the sit-inners had helped to create
protected them. Today occasional pre-1964 sit-in cases continue to be
decided in the lower courts, usually being disposed of on the basis of
abatement.4
7
Thus in contrast to the pattern of decision in the school desegrega-
tion cases, the sit-in decisions were characterized by wholesale granting
of certiorari and by studious avoidance of the broad constitutional
issues underlying the details of particular cases.48 The ad hoc character
of the decisions, however, did not interfere with consistent results. In
case after case a majority of the Court consistently upheld the pro-
testers. The petitioners whose convictions were overturned were, to be
46. 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (companion cases),
47. All demonstration cases, of course, were not sit-ins; the civil rights protest move-
ment has had an almost infinite variety. Freedom rides-sitting in parts of buses reserved
for members of another race or occupying racially proscribed parts of terminals-gave
rise to another well-publicized category of cases also disposed of on limited grounds. The
Alabama freedom ride prosecutions were concluded by a brief Supreme Court order in
early 1965 citing the Boynton case. Abernathy v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 447 (1965). The
Mississippi prosecutions ended in a terse order shortly thereafter citing the Boynton case
and the Alabama cases. Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 529 (1965). The Interstate Com
merce Act controlled both decisions. Constitutional issues of freedom of speech, equal
protection of the laws and the scope of the Commerce Clause were not discussed. In
another bus terminal case the Supreme Court reversed an assault conviction of the Rev.
Fred Shuttlesworth, holding that Alabama had denied him due process of law by
affirming his conviction on grounds other than those for which he had been prosecuted,
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964). The Court rejected Alabamria's
argument that Shuttlesworth had not properly appealed through the Alabama courts
because he had used the wrong size paper.
48. Only concurring and dissenting opinions discussed such issues as whether the Equal
Protection Clause forbids states to punish persons who violate a private property owner's
rules limiting the use of his property on the basis of race, or whether the First Amend-
ment issues involved in the right to speak on another's property all relate to the right
to be there in the first place.
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sure, often model defendants. Their demonstrations had invariably
been nonviolent; they pointed up extreme injustice by emphasizing,
for example, the unfairness of segregated lunch counters in stores
which did not object in the least to selling merchandise to anyone who
could pay; the demonstrators usually had no way of securing desegrega-
tion through the courts, and even where that was in theory possible,
litigation would have been lengthy and expensive. Congress and state
legislatures were, at the outset of the demonstration movement, unre-
sponsive, and state officials were frequently unnecessarily ruthless in
policing and prosecuting the demonstrators. When these factors com-
bined, many of the rules of law that protect defendants in criminal
cases, secure equality to victims of racial discrimination, and protect
speech seemed to operate at maximum potential.
Nevertheless, considerations militating against approval of many
of the protests were never far beneath the surface. The possibility of
violence lurked in many situations. Various Justices in dissents ex-
pressed disquiet about the physical encounters that even peaceful
protestors might provoke by their demonstrationsOO In addition, the
concept of private property-which in the sit-in cases, of course, begged
the question of whether there is a property right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to exclude Negroes from privately owned public places-
exerts a powerful emotional influence. And the two considerations-
fear of violence and attachment to property rights-reinforce one
another because some individuals are quick to employ violence to
protect their property. Finally, there was the uneasy feeling that the
protestors' exhortation to disobey unjust, or even unconstitutional,
laws would encourage disobedience of law in general ro
Thus when, as the demonstrations filled out their first half decade,
nonviolent civil rights demonstrations were joined by more violent
forms of protest and by protests ranging far beyond civil rights, it was
not surprising that a reaction set in. Nor was it surprising that the out-
break of urban rioting-unconnected to the civil rights movement
except that both were fueled by the same injustices-should be uncrit-
ically lumped with the other forms of civil dissonance.
As early as 1964 the Supreme Court allowed some of the more dis-
49. Nor was the majority of the Court altogether free of such concerns. Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), although it could have, did not overrule Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), which had upheld conviction of a speaker for "disorderly
conduct" because he was threatened with attack for what he said. Though Feiner was
seriously disabled by the manner in which it was distinguished, it was left alive. perhaps
to survive and exert influence another day.
50. See Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L REv. 783 (190).
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sonant demonstration convictions to stand by denial of certiorari, dis-
missal of appeal or summary affirmance, even though their facts might
have brought them under cases discussed earlier, in which convictions
were reversed for procedural failings or vagueness. In Ford v. Ten-
nessee51 the defendants were reported to have run down the aisle of a
segregated church and seated themselves despite a request to stay in the
rear; in Jones v. Georgia52 the defendant was reported to have acted
raucously in and about a church; in Diamond v. Louisiana13 the defen-
dant was said to have led a demonstration through the halls of a school.
In all these cases the Court allowed the convictions to stand 6"
Between 1964 and 1967 the public protest cases coming to the Court
less frequently involved protest against racial discrimination and more
often involved disorder. And the Court's refusals to review convictions
proliferated.55 When the Court did grant certiorari, its opinions
increasingly manifested the concern that earlier dissents had displayed,
51. 377 U.S. 994 (1964).
52. 379 U.S. 935 (1964).
53. 376 U.S. 201 (1964) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted).
54. During argument of Diamond Justice Black pointed out by a question that
defendant was arguing for reversal on the ground that he was being prosccuted unfairly,
not that his conduct had been lawful. The Court, following argument, dismissed the
writ as having been improvidently granted, neither reversing nor affirming, perhaps
indicating that it did not want even implicitly to place its stamp of approval oil the
defendant's conduct, although it also did not want to condone the state's method of
proceeding.
55. See Burbridge v. California, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967) (denying cert.) (unlawful assembly
and disturbing the peace; sit-in at bank to protest employment discrimination); Callender
v. New York, 386 U.S. 779 (1967), denying cert. to and dismissing appeal from 18 N.Y,2d
621, 219 N.E.2d 287, 272 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1966) (disorderly conduct; defendant was attempting
to arrest the Mayor of the City of New York); Turner v. New York, 386 U.S. 773 (1967)
(dismissing cert. as improvidently granted) (defendant arrested for disturbing peace by
participating in anti-war demonstration in Duffy Square, New York City); Savlo v.
California, 388 U.S. 460 (1967) (appeal dismissed and cert. denied) (Berkeley demonstration
cases; trespass and resisting arrest); Gray v. California, 382 U.S. 989 (1966) (cert. denied)
(defendants convicted for picketing bakery counter inside supermarket to protest alleged
racial discrimination); Penn v. New York, 383 U.S. 969 (1966), denying cert. to 16 N. .2d
581,- 208 N.E.2d 789, 260 N.Y.S.2d 847, affg mem. 48 Misc. 2d 634, 265 N.Y.S,2d loti
(1964) (disorderly conduct conviction for blocking construction vehicles in protest against
alleged discrimination in construction industry); Smith v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 838
(1966), denying cert. to 46 N.J. 510, 218 A.2d 147 (disorderly conduct conviction for
demonstration at city council meeting); Baer v. New York, 384 U.S. 154 (1966) (appeal
dismissed) (disorderly conduct conviction for rcfusing to leave police station when asked
to in anticipation of racial violence); Martin v. New York, 382 U.S. 828 (1965) (cert. denied)
(defendants refused to leave board room after conclusion of municipal school board
meeting).
The Court did not turn thumbs down on all demonstration petitioners during this
latter period, but the exceptions were few. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967),
involved an anachronism, a classic lunch counter sit-in situation in which the Court
reversed a ruling that after a nolle the prosecutor can reinstitute suit. The issue, which
was atypical, involved the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial; in Mason v. Biloxi,
386 U.S. 370 (1966), rev'g 184 So. 2d 113 (1966), the Court reversed a conviction for trespass
on a beach that had been constructed with federal funds.
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implicitly and explicitly, towards the rising level of dissonance in the
country.
In 1965, in Wells v. Reynolds,50 the Court affirmed without opinion
a district court's refusal to enjoin prosecution of civil rights workers
under companion statutes, one of which had previously been held
unconstitutional in Herndon v. Lowry.i- The trial court had held that
constitutional defenses could and should be raised in state court
criminal proceedings, although paradoxically it exercised jurisdiction
by ordering a reduction in bond. One would have thought that the
jurisdictional question-independent of the merits-was disposed of
by Dombrowski v. Pfister,58 which had held six months earlier that
federal courts had jurisdiction over not dissimilar claims in an action
for injunction. Perhaps the difference was that Dombrowski involved
restraining a prosecution under the Louisiana Subversive Activities
and Communist Control Law-there was no question of overt conduct
in the streets. In Wells, however, the trial court opinion recited that
the march, out of which the prosecution grew, "was attended by con-
siderable commotion, and before reaching the announced destination
bottles, stones and bricks were being hurled, plate glass windows in
business establishments were being knocked out, citizens were being
threatened and the peace and security of the entire area through which
the procession was passing was being disrupted."GO The opinion con-
ceded that "[t]here is no evidence that the Plaintiffs Wells and Harris
committed any of these acts of violence but it is clear that the acts were
being committed by those marching with them or by sympathizers
accompanying the marchers."0 10 In any event there was no Supreme
Court opinion, although Justice Brennan, who had written the Dom-
browski opinion, and Justices Douglas and Fortas dissented.
Conspicuous among refusals to hear was the five-to-four dismissal
of certiorari as improvidently granted in NAACP v. Overstreet1 the
following year. The case posed the issue whether Georgia courts
could make the national organization liable for acts committed by a
local branch. The dissenters observed: "Although the record does not
contain any evidence of misconduct on the part of the Branch's mem-
bers or officers, the picketing apparently attracted substantial crowds.
56. 382 U.S. 39, aff'g Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
57. 201 US. 242 (1937).
58. 380 US. 479 (1965).
59. Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp. 779, 782 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
60. Id.
61. 384 U.S. 118 (1966).
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There were incidents involving the intimidation of customers, blocking
of sidewalks, and scattered incidents of violence.
'0 2
In 1967 the Court, in McLaurin v. Greenville,3 made a similar
silent disposition, denying certiorari 64 in the case of a group of civil
rights workers who made speeches on the Greenville courthouse steps
and were prosecuted under a state statute identical to the one the Court
had previously struck down in Cox v. Louisiana65 as unconstitutionally
vague on its face. The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision observed
that "there was a clear and present danger of a riot or disturbance of
court then in session.. ."I and held the case to be controlled by Fciner
v. New York.07 It is difficult to put aside the feeling that if the case
had come up three or four years earlier with Edwards v. South Carolina,
Fields v. South Carolina or Henry v. City of Rock Hill,68 it would have
been difficult to distinguish among them and the judgment would
have been reversed. And during the October 1966 Term, a majority
for the first time by affirmance of convictions turned its face against
civil rights demonstrators in two important cases, Adderley v. Florida0
and Walker v. City of Birmingham.70
The earlier dissenting view which achieved majority status in Ad-
derley and Walker was fostered by Justice Black. In Bell v. Maryland, in
an opinion joined by Justices Harlan and White, he closed with a dra-
matic statement of the dangers he saw inherent in group demonstra-
tions. Experience shows, he thought, that property owners are fre.
quently stirred to violence when their property is forcibly invaded or
occupied by others. Nor can reasoned debate and the settlement of
acrimonious disputes be carried on in an atmosphere of violence. As a
result mass demonstrations are actually counterproductive, leading to
outright conflict and rule by the strongest, rather than to persuasion
and amelioration of the protestors' plight. 1
Similarly in Cox v. Louisiana, a street demonstration case, Justice
Black referred in dissent to "2,000 or more people who stood right
across the street from the courthouse and jail,"7 2 and to the "intimida-
62. Id. at 119. The majority's dismissal, of course, was not an afflrmance.
63. 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
64. The Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented from the denial.
65. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
66. 187 So. 2d 854, 859 (1966).
67. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
68. See p. 1531 supra.
69. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
70. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
71. 378 U.S. at 346.
72. 379 U.S. at 582.
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tion and dangers that inhere in huge gatherings at courthouse doors
and jail doors." 73 He concluded:
Experience demonstrates that it is not a far step from what to
many seems the earnest, honest, patriotic, kind-spirited multitude
of today, to the fanatical, threatening, lawless mob of tomorrow.
And the crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today can
be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs pressuring the courts for
precisely opposite ends.74
The Cox dissent, in which Justice Black was joined by Justices Clark,
White and Harlan, was the prelude to the formation of a new majority
on street demonstrations.
Adderley, in which Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White
constituted the majority, involved a charge of trespass arising out of
a protest against the arrest of students who were imprisoned at the
Tallahassee, Florida, jail. On its facts the case was much like Edwards
(in which Justice Stewart had written the opinion with only Justice
Clark dissenting) except that the demonstration took place on jail
property, not statehouse grounds, and defendants were charged under a
trespass statute, not with common law breach of the peace. These were
the articulated differences. But the most significant distinction may
very well be that Adderley was decided in November 1966 at a time
when the dissonance of demonstrations of all sorts had reached a new
high. Justice Black's Adderley majority opinion went to great lengths
to emphasize the impromptu and disorganized nature of the protest,
the size of the crowd, and the demonstrators' interference with passage
to and from the jail. Analogizing the state's interest in protection of
jail property to the power of a private owner of property to preserve it
for any nondiscriminatory use to which it is lawfully dedicated, the
opinion denied that the demonstrators had any constitutional right
to enter or remain on jailhouse grounds for purposes of demonstra-
tion.75
During the same term of the Court, Walker v. City of Birmingham10
(in which Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the same majority as
in Adderley) upheld the contempt conviction of the Reverend Martin
73. Id. at 583.
74. Id. at 584.
75. Justice Black's analogy to the power of a private owner of property, as Justice
Douglas pointed out in dissent, ignored that fact that the rights of asembly and
petition for redress of grievances do not run to private proprietors, but do restrain the
state in its dealings with its citizens. 385 US. at 52. The inappropriate reference to
private property was apparently an attempt to inject into the majority opinion one of
the central themes of the sit-in dissents.
76. 388 US. 307 (1967).
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Luther King, Jr., and others for having violated an injunction for-
bidding the celebrated Good Friday and Easter Sunday Birmingham
marches that were crucial to the demonstrations which led to passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Some of the tone and language of the
Walker opinion is reminiscent of demonstration case dissents several
years earlier. The Alabama court held that petitioners owed obedience
to the injunction and should have moved to dissolve it before disobey-
ing it, even though it may have been unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court declined to pass on the validity of the injunction, holding that
the only question before it was whether the court order had in fact
been disobeyed. The entire sense of the opinion is to value order and
orderly judicial procedure over speech, even if that speech is suppressed
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments:
The rule of law that Alabama followed in this case reflects a
belief that in the fair administration of justice no man can be
judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righ-
teous his motives, and irrespective of his race, color, politics, or
religion. This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were consti-
tutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry
their battle to the streets. One may sympathize with the petition-
ers' impatient commitment to their cause. But respect for judicial
process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which
alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom.Y
Justice Brennan, in dissent, made no effort to conceal his belief that
the majority's overriding concern with public order had warped its
perception of the issues involved.
We cannot permit fears of "riots" and "civil disobedience" gener-
ated by slogans like "Black Power" to divert our attention from
what is here at stake-not violence or the right of the State to
control its streets and sidewalks, but the insulation from attack of
ex parte orders and legislation upon which they are based even
when patently impermissible prior restraints on the exercise of
the First Amendment rights .... 78
But precisely such fears were diverting the Court's attention, and many
of its decisions against demonstrators reflect the effects of its concern.
III. Conclusion
The early school decisions with their attention to principles and
avoidance of specifics, principally served the purposes of educating the
77. Id. at 320-21.
78. Id. at 349.
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country and making dear that defiance could not succeed, rather than
of compelling action by particular parties. Ultimately, of course,
Brown implied a power to compel change; it would have been useless
as a national guide if that were not so. But no move was made by the
Court toward implementation of the kind found repeatedly in the
reapportionment cases, to mention only one example D
Several reasons may be suggested for the Court's reluctance to
grapple with detail in the school cases. The Court was, in the early
cases, chiefly setting standards for the lower courts, where the great
bulk of litigation went on. Apart from the uninviting prospect of re-
peated involvement in the intricacies of school desegregation, it may
be that the Court spoke in generalities and avoided details because its
determinations could be of only limited utility in the overall desegre-
gation process. The principal reason for the slow pace of school de-
segregation before 1964 was not, after all, inattention to detail or the
"deliberate speed" formula. Rather, it was the failure of most deep
southern districts to do anything at all. The typical district would start
desegregation only if sued. Since the 1964 Civil Rights Act had not yet
been passed, there was no authority in the federal government to bring
suit and no administrative mechanism to compel change; and the
resources to bring private suit were limited. The NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, which has brought virtually all of the
nongovernmental southern school desegregation cases, has been able
to handle about 300 cases since 1954, but there are approximately
3,000 districts which might have been sued. All these factors in com-
bination meant that prior to 1964 not only would implementation by
Court decision have had to proceed on a strictly case-by-case basis, but
only a small fraction of the South's segregated school districts could
have been affected. As a practical matter, therefore, the Court chose to
exert its influence through strong moral leadership.
With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the vesting of
authority to implement Brown in HEW and the Justice Department,
79. As Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and a
partisan in the school desegregation struggle, I feel that the detachment which typified
1955-1965, and which persists to a degree that is not yet dear, was unfortunate. The
principles involved in desegregation and the vigor with which they are ad~anced inhere
in details, e.g., whether a plan should take twelve years, or less; whether plaintiffs should
be afforded desegregated education even though they are not within grades covered by a
plan their lawsuit -wins; whether a school district is gerrymandered; and -o forth. The
Court cannot pass on all details of all plans, but it might recognize that in the sum of
details reside the larger principles it espouses. Those whose task it is to fight egregation
hope that Rogers v. Paul, 582 U.S. 198 (1965). and the recent "freedom of choice" decisions,
see note 24 supra, show a new disposition to take such grounds.
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however, the practical significance of a Supreme Court school desegre-
gation decision changed considerably.8 0 Uniformity became possible
for the first time. Since it was now far less likely that a district would
be compelled to comply while its neighbors remained in violation,
one incentive to delay desegregation in hopes of escaping altogether
was removed. Most important, HEW enforces guidelines embodying
a distillation of judicial opinion.81 To the extent that the Court up-
grades specific standards, they are then capable of widespread enforce-
ment by an agency with potentially large staff and appropriations,
although the funding and vigor of the HEW enforcement staff are
subject to political considerations.8 2 In addition the Department of
Justice, aided by the investigative power of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, has begun to take a more active part in school desegre-
gation.83 The role of private suits in the school area is changing back
to what it was before Brown, to innovating and pushing forward in
situations where government for one reason or another does not,"
Another consideration which may have inclined the Court to avoid
involvement in a multitude of school desegregation cases was that
until the Civil Rights Act was passed the country had not yet shown
that it endorsed the position taken by the Supreme Court in the first
school cases. President Eisenhower, for one, explicitly refused to ap-
prove of them. While all civil liberties decisions are by definition to
some degree unpopular-there would be little need for judicial relief
if political remedies were readily available-the Brown decision, espe-
cially in some parts of the country, was more unpopular than most. It
80. See generally U.S. CoMMIssIOn ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REroRT oN SOUTHERN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 1966-67 (1967). Justice Jackson recognized the utility of administrative
enforcement and some of the limitations of private suit during the argument of the
early school cases when he said from the bench: "It means that private litigation will
result in every school district in order to get effective enforcement, and that Is why, I
suppose, this, separate but tqual doctrine has never really been enforced, because many
disatdvantaged people cannot afford these lawsuits. But the judicial remedy means just
that, does it not, lawsuit after lawsuit? .. . Tjhat is why in some cases it lis been
necessary to set up something like the SEC to enforce individual rights in security
transactions, and the Interstate Commerce Commission." Transcript of Argument, the
School Segregation Cases, Dec. 8, 1953, at 169.
81. See Comment, The Courts, HEW and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALr L.J,
321 9- passim (1967). See also 2 T, EMERSON, D. HABER 9. N. DosEN, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIcH's IN THE UNITED STATES 1300-32 (student ed. 1967).
82. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1066, § 4, at 9, col. 3 (letter to the editor by Jack Greenberg),
83. "Since passage of the Act, participation by the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice in school segregation litigation has reached major proportions,"
US. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966.67
(1967). See also Comment, supra note 81.
84. For example, the three cases decided in May of this year, see note 24 supra, as
well as those handed down in the 1965 term, see p. 1527 stpra, were brought by the
Legal Defense Fund.
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affected a large part of the nation, invited opposition by powerful
southern politicians, and brought down a storm of invective on the
Court. Negroes at the time of Brown were substantially disenfranchised
in the region it affected most. And the Court came close to suffering,
through Congressional legislation, heavy damage to its jurisdiction.
After its courageous and difficult initial steps it would be surprising
if the Court had undercut its effectiveness by openly acknowledging
a hesitancy to plunge deeper into such heavy weather. On the other
hand it would be surprising if, in addition to other factors that affect
decision-making, consequences for the Court as an institution did not
play some part. The Court's limiting of its role in the early school
desegregation cases to enunciation of fundamental principles may well
have reflected its estimation of the most effective and prudent course
open to it. Once passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 signalled that
the rest of the country had at last caught up, however, the Court could
feel free to involve itself more intimately in necessary implementation.
In contrast to its approach in the school suits, in the protest demon-
stration area the Court did not shy away from repeatedly weighing
the particulars of complex fact situations. It did this, moreover, in a
style unlike that of the school suits by normally avoiding expansive
constitutional pronouncements. This had, to begin with, the effect of
leaving the Court's options open for later cases, in which. it refused to
review the claims of petitioners in other kinds of demonstrations. It
was one thing to refuse to hear narrow evidentiary arguments or claims
concerning procedure or vagueness; it would have been quite another
to refuse for any length of time to hear cases involving recently de-
limited First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In part, cases may have gone off so narrowly because general propo-
sitions governing the right to demonstrate cannot be stated as simply
as general propositions governing the right to desegregated education.
Whether there is a Fourteenth Amendment right to sit in a privately
owned public restaurant, or a Commerce Clause immunity from arrest
for trespass at a bus terminal lunch counter, is a far more complex
and difficult question than those raised by the post-Brown school cases.
Avoidance has been a natural response.
But if that is the case, why did the Court grant review at all? Ordi-
narily the Court does not review minor criminal cases involving limited
issues. Indeed, most defendants convicted of trespass, breach of the
85. See generally CoNGR.SSIONAL QUARTERLY SE-RVICE, CONGRESS AND TIM NATION., 1915-
1964, at 1442 (1965).
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peace and similar crimes simply pay their small fines or serve their
brief sentences and let the matter drop. Certainly the Court, having
once decided the narrow issues to which it confined itself, would not
have ruled on them repeatedly if something more were not involved,
if the cases had not been "important" in the sense that merits granting
of review. The fact that the cases came up in such volume at all was of
course in one sense an index of importance. But precisely what is
required to move the Court to grant certiorari is a difficult question,
the answer to which varies from case to case.
The existence of admittedly "serious legal questions" may not be
sufficient.... Importance is a relative factor, dependent upon the
type of issue involved, the way in which it was decided below, the
status of the law on the matter, the correctness of the decision
below, and the nature and number of persons who may be affected
by the case. . . . The concept of importance relates to the im-
portance of the issues "to the public as distinguished from" impor-
tance to the particular "parties" involved.8
0
It is in this realm of significance to the public of the issues raised that
the true importance of the sit-in cases lay. Apart from their conse-
quences for particular defendants and for the civil rights movement,
the reversals meant something for the education of the country. The
Court has long recognized the "chilling" effect of pending criminal
prosecutions on speech. 7 One might analogously describe the Court's
repeated reversals of protest demonstration convictions as having a
"thawing" effect.
The cumulative effect of the sit-in reversals no doubt was to en-
courage the demonstrators to continue their activities, even though
the articulated bases of decision were closely limited. While it may
have been coincidence that the Court agreed to review Boynton8gt
shortly after the sit-ins began, the thawing effect of Garner", could not
have been explained away so easily. The unbroken string of reversals
of subsequent years-because they were reversals and not because of
what the opinions said or did not say on large constitutional questions
-had similar consequences. Demonstrators were less likely to be
intimidated by fear of conviction. Those who otherwise might have
remained in jail were free to protest elsewhere. The consistent reversals
gave an implicit stamp of approval to the cause espoused by the demon-
86. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 136-37 (3d ed. 1962).
87. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
88. See p. 1528 supra.
89. See p. 1529 supra.
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strators and allowed them to work toward realization of ideals em-
braced by the Court itself in BrownY0
Less certain is the relationship between the Court's recent pattern
of disposition of protest cases and the increased dissonance of public
protest generally. But the coincidence suggests that the affirmance of
convictions and general indisposition to grant review in demonstration
cases may be an effort to retard or undo supposed effects of the earlier
thaw and to allow the states to reimpose a freeze. Refusals to review,
as in Diamond, Jones, Ford and Overstreet, or affirmnance, as in Wells,
Adderley and Walker, have had the effect of leaving civil rights prose-
cutions in the hands of state authorities. Consistent refusal to review
the non-civil rights protests has had the same effect.
If recent Court decisions in the civil rights area have been in part a
reaction to the rising tide of civil dissonance on other fronts, the
question remains whether such a reaction is either logical or likely to
produce the desired results. No one, of course, can be sure of the
causal relationships among the various forms of protest. Whether the
nonviolent civil rights demonstrations that were legal or intended to
be tests of legality led to those which went dearly beyond legal bounds
is a question which must be left to the social psychologists. The rela-
tionships between civil rights protests and public demonstrations on
other issues, such as student-university relationships or the war in
Viet Nam, is again something about which we cannot be sure. But it
is hard to believe that if there had been no Birmingham or Selma we
would have avoided Berkeley and Columbia or the recent confronta-
don at the Pentagon.
Even if we assume that legal protest contributed to wider dissonance
and civil disobedience, will curtailing the scope of legal protest turn
the clock back? Is this a two-way or a one-way street? More impor-
tantly, will judicial reluctance or refusal to upset convictions based on
irregular modes of prosecution promote public tranquillity, or will it
90. This is not to say that the cases reversing demonstration convictions were wrongly
decided for the sake of promoting social ends. As the Court held, there was a failure of
evidence in Garner; in Edwards the common law doctrine of breach of the peace was 'ague;
the Interstate Commerce Act was violated in Abernathy, Maryland had passed a statute
that might have affected the judgments in Bell, and so forth. In addition, it should be
pointed out that counsel for petitioners, besides arguing the free speech and equal
protection issues, regularly presented their cases on the assumption that the Justices, or
some of them, might be persuaded to rule for the petitioners if given an option which
permitted reversal on narrow, non-Fourteenth Amendment grounds. But the suggestion
by counsel of limited grounds for reversal was not always necessary. It is noteworthy that
although petitioner did not argue the abatement ground for reversal in Bell v. Mary-
land, the Court adopted it anyway. The briefs of counsel are summarized in 12 L Ed. 2d
1335-36.
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instead weaken respect for law and law enforcement? Whatever the
answers to these questions, there would seem to be no evidence now
that but for the recent reining in, there would have been more dis-
turbances and violence.
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